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1. Introduction
All organizations have become increasingly reliant on technology to conduct their
operations over the past several decades. Both businesses and government entities use complex
information technology systems and collect vast amounts of sensitive data. This newfound
reliance on technology has created complex security threats for businesses and their
stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers. The growing dependence on these technologies
and the existence of vulnerabilities in them is resulting in increased frequency and severity of
cybersecurity attacks (Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn 2020).
According to the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Carriers and Studies [NICCS], a
cybersecurity attack is “an attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, or
information, or an attempt to compromise system integrity.” Attacks can be active where the
perpetrators attempt to alter some system or data or passive where they obtain unauthorized
information. Cybersecurity incidents can also include unintentional events such as data losses.
All types of cybersecurity incidents can have disastrous effects on their victims. Perpetrators can
disrupt normal business operations by accessing critical systems, corrupting company data, and
gaining unauthorized access to protected sensitive data.
Cyber attacks have financial mitigation costs as well as reputational costs for the target
company and economy-wide costs and implications. According to Smith and Lostri (2020), it is
estimated that cybercrime has resulted in a staggering 1 trillion-dollar yearly strain on our
economy since 2018. In 2020, the annual monetary loss directly from cybercrime was estimated
to be 945 billion dollars, with global spending in response exceeding 145 billion dollars. These
numbers represent a 50% increase in spending since 2018 and 1% of global gross domestic
product. While some of the increase may be attributed to better reporting, the bulk is likely
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driven by crime growth. In a survey conducted by Smith and Lostri (2020), among 1,332
respondents who fell victim to a cyber incident in 2019, 45% invested in new cybersecurity
software, 39% increased the company budget for cybersecurity incidents, and 30% hired new IT
security staff. It is not surprising that an increase in security spending often follows the
company’s discovery and reporting of a vulnerability. With a growing reliance on cyberspace to
conduct operations, the costs to combat and prevent vulnerabilities are also on the rise.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX] put in place several initiatives to promote the
stability of the national financial system and improve the reliability of financial information
systems. Section 404 of SOX requires all publicly traded companies to establish effective
internal controls and procedures to safeguard financial reporting. It also requires that the annual
reports of these firms include both the firm’s and the independent auditor’s assessment and
attestation of these internal controls. One of the main goals of these controls is to ensure the
integrity of financial data. Reports of material weaknesses from either the management or the
auditor indicate weak internal controls. SOX creators did not explicitly have cybersecurity in
mind and rather were focused on preventing unethical manipulation of financial reporting by
management and other company insiders. However, as the digital era has reshaped data security
since 2002, it is easy to see that efficient internal controls may also aid with cybersecurity risks.
Correspondingly, reported material weakness of internal controls may be silent indicators of a
higher risk of cyber breaches and their costs.
Investing in internal controls and, more generally, information security is a growing
necessity for all firms and can minimize the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents. Gordon
and Loeb (2002) recognized the priority of increased spending to combat cyber threats and
created the Gordon-Loeb model to determine the optimal amount organizations should invest in
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information security. Hausken (2006) highlights investments in security technology are in the
organization’s best interest when the expected rate of return on the investment exceeds the
average cost of a cyber attack. Even with these preventive measures in place to minimize the
likelihood of a cybersecurity attack, an incident may still occur. Therefore, firms must have
consistent policies and procedures for informing the relevant stakeholders, including investors,
that a cybersecurity breach occurred.
At this time, there are no rules or laws associated with cybersecurity disclosures. The
Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] has released some guidance on best practices when
assessing a cybersecurity incident. The SEC’s first guidance was released in 2011 to help firms
make disclosures that fit the standards of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Several years later, in 2018, the SEC released its second guidance, which sought to
reinforce and expand 2011’s staff guidance by providing additional information when making
disclosures regarding cybersecurity incidents and risk factors. Importantly, both guidance
editions provide only a loose framework of suggestions and do not normalize the format, timing,
or substance of disclosures for any cybersecurity incidents.
The lack of standardization within the cybersecurity risk disclosure is increasingly
becoming a cause of concern among regulatory officials. On March 9, 2022, the SEC published
Release 33-11038, a proposal for new “rules and amendments to enhance and standardize
disclosures regarding cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance, and indecent
reporting by public companies.” If the SEC can generate enough support to finalize this new
rule, the updated cybersecurity disclosure regulation will provide investors and other information
users with more timely information relating to cybersecurity risks and incidents. The supporters
of the proposal argue that this would enable stakeholders to better mitigate those respective risks
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and incidents. The two areas discussed within this proposal include specific incident disclosure
and, more general, risk management, strategy, and governance disclosures.
The proposed incident disclosure places a judgement of materiality front and center – the
proposed rule has 118 references to the word “material.” This raises a complex question of what
constitutes materiality. Several law cases such as TSC Industries, Inc v. Northway, Inc, Basic, Inc
v. Levison and Matrixx Inciatives, Inc. v. Siracusano has provided valuable insight into this
issue. A public organization experiences a material breach when the compromised information
has a substantial likelihood to be important to a reasonable shareholder, to current or potential
investment decisions, and/or results in any significant alteration to the ‘total mix’ of information
that is made available to shareholders. Previously, cyber disclosures proposed by the SEC’s 2011
and 2018 guidance recommended that it was best practice of an organization to include
cybersecurity incidents in disclosure when the breach was determined to be material in nature.
However, it neither mandated this nor provided a suggested disclosure format. SEC Release 3311038 aims to modify the list of events requiring a Form 8-K filing to include cybersecurity
incidents. This would require the registrants to disclose such events within four business days
upon the discovery of a material cybersecurity incident. This requirement would ensure timely
reporting of breaches upon discovery and consistency between public firms.
SEC Release 33-11038 also includes proposed updates to the risk management, strategy,
and governance disclosure. Rather than the actual incidents, this area regards enhancements of
preventative measures firms take to prepare themselves against the risk of potential breaches.
This new requirement adds regulation 106 to form S-K to “describe its policy and procedures, if
any, for the identification and management of risks from cybersecurity threats, including whether
the registrant considers cybersecurity as part of its business strategy, financial planning and
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capital allocation.” The guidance would apply even to foreign private issuers. It proposes to add
Item 16J of form 20F to require annual reporting of cybersecurity policies, procedures and
strategies. SEC’s implementation of these new cybersecurity requirements is directed to
strengthen overall internal controls with the goal of creating consistency amongst breach
reporting and cybersecurity disclosures.
This paper documents the reporting to the SEC of 197 major incidents of cybersecurity
breaches among public firms in the years 2011-2019. My goal is to contribute to the debate on
the need to revise the disclosure guidance by evaluating the extent to which cybersecurity
breaches are disclosed in SEC filings under the current regulatory regime. In evaluating the
individual breaches, I document whether prior to the SEC’s 2022 proposed amendment, firms
were already following the SEC recommendation of disclosing material cybersecurity breaches
in a timely manner. I find that it is extremely rare for a firm to follow the recommendations set
by the SEC. The majority of companies that experience a cybersecurity breach did not make
formal disclosure in SEC filings even when a substantial number of customer files were affected
in the breach. This study also shows that among the firms that did disclose the breach to the SEC,
most did not follow the SEC’s proposed four-day timeline and only provided very minimal
information in the actual disclosure.
My findings suggest a significant inconsistency and suboptimality in existing disclosure
practices. Given the growing number of annual cybersecurity incidents and the continued
expected growth in reliance on technology, the results lend support to the SEC’s current
proposals to formalize timely and substantive disclosures of these issues.
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2. Background
2.1 Prior Literature
Research conducted by Amir, Levi, and Livne (2018) is closely related to the objectives
of this paper. According to their study, when a breach is classified as a material cyber attack,
pertinent information should always be disclosed to inform all necessary parties. However, firms
often are found underreporting instances of cyber attacks, likely as a direct result of incentives
held by management to withhold negative information and the belief that investors are unlikely
to discover a cyber attack independently. To evaluate the degree public companies are
withholding reports of cybersecurity incidents, the authors analyze data of cyber attacks from
2010 to 2015, discovering that only 300 public firms made disclosures related to cyber incidents
while independent sources reported over 1,000. Their findings suggest that managers disclose
cyber attacks only when investors already suspect that, with a 40% chance, an attack has
occurred. The authors conclude that voluntary disclosure of cyber attacks is rare. I build on this
work by focusing on a more recent sample when the market participants are more aware of
cybersecurity threats and expect greater disclosure and by examining the method and details of
the disclosure itself.
Cybersecurity incidents have also increased audit risk awareness when conducting audit
reports of affected firms. Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn (2020) assess the implications of
cybersecurity incidents for audit quality on a sample of 329 incidents from Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse from 2005 to 2014. They focus on audits carried out by the Big Four audit firms
to ensure consistency among auditors and clients. The authors conclude that cybersecurity
incidents do not result in an observable deterioration in audit quality. Rather the opposite
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conclusion is made, showing that auditors of breached firms increase substantive testing and
audit efforts, and this higher scrutiny leads to an observed increase in audit quality.
Information asymmetry between organizations and investors is another factor influencing
cybersecurity risk disclosure among public companies. Research conducted by Cheong, Yoon,
Cho, and No (2021) explores how the growth of cybersecurity breaches puts stakeholders’
welfare at risk. This study examines the informativeness of the firm’s cybersecurity risk
disclosure, highlighting them as the primary source of data for stakeholders seeking to gauge the
cybersecurity risks of the firms. The authors analyze 25,179 cybersecurity risk disclosures from
2006 to 2017. The analysis suggests that firms do not provide a sufficient amount of disclosure
after experiencing a cybersecurity breach. Firms provide more information about the risks
derived from a third party and less disclosure about their own incident control and risk
mitigation, and business continuity. Often firms provide information that does not support the
overall informativeness of disclosure, such as focusing on control-related damage mitigation
factors rather than the relevant vulnerability-related factors. Inconsistencies in presentation
among firms create a universal disclosure obfuscation, reducing the informativeness gained from
disclosures.
A practitioner work “The Hidden Costs of Cybercrime” by Smith and Lostri (2020)
recognizes the substantial costs of cybersecurity breaches. Analysis of 1,500 company surveys
showed that only 4% did not have a cyber incident in 2019. Furthermore, 92% of those who did
experience an incident recognize the damages that span beyond just the financial costs.
Highlighting the persistence of the problem, results showed that more than 50% of those
interviewed did not have plans to prevent cybersecurity incidents, and of those who did, only
32% believed their plans to be effective. Hidden costs often associated with cybercrime include
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opportunity costs, system downtime, reduced efficiency, brand damage and loss of trust, incident
response costs, and cyber risk insurance.
The preceding literature covers some of the pressing issues already researched and
discoveries made in relation to cybersecurity disclosures. This paper will build on and contribute
to this literature by using the reporting data to infer the firms’ formal disclosure procedures and
processes when impacted by a breach.
2.2 Institutional Detail
As of the writing of this paper in the spring of 2022, there is no official guidance issued
by the SEC with regard to cyber incident disclosure. Thus, important questions open to
interpretation are: what constitutes a security breach, when is it necessary to disclose, and what
are the proper disclosure procedures. Any cybersecurity disclosure made at this time is voluntary
and up to the firm’s discretion in terms of timeliness and content. There are likely limited legal
repercussions to insufficient disclosure of a cybersecurity incident, however, the firm could face
reputational damages from customers and investors. To provide insights into recommended
procedures, the SEC has issued two pieces of guidance addressing the growing topic of
cybersecurity over the past decade.
Its first guidance issued in 2011 acknowledged the growing reliance on technology to
conduct business operations while also recognizing the risks associated with its newfound
dependence. To better inform investors regarding potential risks, it suggested that it is the
responsibility of the organization to provide disclosure of the inherent risk factors that may
influence stakeholders’ perception of the riskiness of the firm. To maintain the SEC’s
fundamentals of timely, comprehensive and accurate information it put forth the expectation that
organizations properly disclose instances of cybersecurity risk or incidents determined to be
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material in nature. The SEC’s 2011 guidance identifies an event or information as material if it
would cause a reasonable investor to reevaluate investment decisions or alter company
perception.
The second regulatory update was released in 2018 as a means for the SEC to provide
further guidance in light of the growing instances of cybersecurity incidents. It included two
topics not included in the 2011 edition issued by the SEC, the importance of cybersecurity
policies and procedures and insider trading prohibition in cybersecurity. In the guidance, the
SEC recommended that all organizations establish efficient disclosure controls and procedures to
ensure that any relevant information about the cybersecurity incident is made known to the
appropriate personnel. They also specified that procedures should be put in place to prevent
directors, officers, or company insiders from making trades based on material nonpublic
information regarding cybersecurity risks and incidents facing the company. Preventing any
company officials from an unfair advantage due to insider information that has not been made
public with respect to cybersecurity is aligned with other anti-fraud laws. Incorporating these
new provisions and elaborations of prior recommendations allowed for further insight into how
organizations should address cyber threats.
A concern about mandating detailed disclosure on cybersecurity threats and defenses is
that following these recommendations could create a “roadmap” for those seeking to penetrate a
company. In other words, providing so much detail into what occurred within the organizations
and the preventative measures could be seen as providing cybercriminals instructions on how to
successfully breach that or other organizations in the future. The SEC commented on these
concerns stating that they do not expect nor recommend organizations provide such detail
regarding specific, technical information about cybersecurity systems or any potential
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vulnerabilities that would inherently make the organization more susceptible to a cybersecurity
incident. Rather it is advised that all firms take the necessary steps to inform the public of
material breaches that would likely influence investors’ decisions in relation to the firm.
All information pertaining to cybersecurity disclosures should provide accurate, timely,
and comprehensive information when a breach has occurred. The organization itself should not
be the only focal point when making a cybersecurity disclosure. It should also make an effort to
give investors the chance to make an educated decision regarding their investment. To
accomplish this feat, organizations should be making disclosures when the impact of the attack is
determined to be material in nature. When this type of breach occurs, the organization should
adequately describe the intellectual property stolen and note if the reported financial information
is compromised or is no longer an accurate representation of future operating results or company
financial condition.
2.3 Hypotheses
Given that the SEC has no formal rules and regulations regarding cybersecurity
disclosure and promotes voluntary disclosure, it is no surprise that the lack of legal consequences
for failing to disclose a breach has resulted in firms creating their own disclosure procedures
leading to inconsistency between firms. This paper aims to highlight procedures in which public
organizations disclose instances of cybersecurity events, if at all. In doing this, the first part of
my paper will be descriptive. Focusing on a sample of large breaches, I will document how they
are reported to the SEC. While firms may disclose breaches in other forms (press releases, on
their website), it is critical to recognize that SEC EDGAR system is the centralized, public
repository of information. Thus, it is important to understand how these incidents are reported to
their system.
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Upon analyzing the research conducted by prior literature, I believe that organizations
will be more likely to make a formal 8-K cybersecurity disclosure if a larger number of records
become compromised in a breach. I propose that any organization that experiences a cyber
incident that compromises more than approximately a million client records, whether that may be
usernames and passwords or private personal information, will issue a corresponding 8-K. In
instances where less than a million client records were compromised, I expect the incident will
not be formally disclosed in the 8-K, but rather will only be addressed in a press release or in
secondary sources.
I will examine whether firms which have reported material internal control weaknesses
are more likely to disclose the cybersecurity incident. I do not offer a prediction on the direction
of this relationship. On the one hand, firms that have material weaknesses may have a poorer
information system overall, and thus the management may not have the sufficient information to
file a Form 8-K. On the other hand, these firms may be actively mitigating this weakness, and the
extra scrutiny from internal and external auditors or other stakeholders may lead to more
reporting.
I will also provide further descriptives on the timeliness and extent of SEC disclosures.
Due to the likely absence of legal consequences from regulatory bodies when failing to make
voluntary disclosures, I expect a large variance and overall relatively poor quality. I believe that
if a firm decides to report its breach, there is a high likelihood that it will not meet the SEC’s
recommendation of disclosure within four business days upon discovery.
3. Data and Methodology
The dataset of cybersecurity breaches used to test these theories was retrieved from
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) website. Established in 1992, PRC is a nonprofit
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organization whose mission is focused on helping people find answers to complex questions by
publishing informative materials with the overall objective of protecting privacy for all. The
dataset is a comprehensive list of known data breaches starting in 2005. The data includes key
information such as organization name, location, a description of the breach, company industry,
a type of breach, and the year it occurred.
Upon initial collection, the PRC dataset consisted of 9016 entries of data breaches
ranging from 2004 to 2019. To obtain the final dataset, I made several decisions to reduce the
sample size to identify the most relevant sample for manual analysis. See Table 1 for the full
sample selection. First, I reduced the dataset to focus only on companies included in the S&P
500 as of 2021, which resulted in 360 entries. This was done to ensure all breaches were for
public companies that follow SEC reporting standards and to focus on large firms more likely to
be both targeted by material threats and concerned about reputational costs. Then I decided to
eliminate all entries occurring before 2011, to reflect the complete lack of guidance for
cybersecurity disclosure procedures until 2011. Next, I eliminated cybersecurity incidents that
entailed more than one entity to focus only on firm-specific incidents. This reduced the dataset to
197 entries.
For each of the 197 security incidents, I carried out a manual analysis of SEC filings of 8K and 10-K forms to identify the primary method of disclosure to the SEC. An 8-K report is a
‘current report’ that firms use to disclose to the SEC and the stakeholders major events in a
timely manner. While there are a number of specific items which must be disclosed in an 8-K
(such as a bankruptcy, an impairment of assets, a change of management, etc.), importantly, the
guidance states that other non-specified events must also be disclosed under the item of “other
events” if they are material. Thus, if the firms deem a security incident material, they should
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disclose it within four business days as encouraged by the SEC from 2011 and as the currently
proposed guidance seeks to mandate. After collecting the date of the incident recording in the
PRC dataset, I examine the 8-Ks filed from 6 months before to 6 months after the incident. I
focus on 8-Ks filed with an item 8.01 “other events” disclosure referring to the cyber incident.
I also examine the 10-Ks of these firms to identify whether they are disclosing these
incidents in periodic filings. This allows me to examine how firms are trading off timely
reporting of an event when information may yet be incomplete or a delayed reporting of a more
thorough and complete nature. Form 10-K, otherwise known as the ‘annual report,’ provides a
comprehensive overview of the company’s business and financial condition and includes audited
financial statements. As such, even if no timely disclosure of an event happened in an 8-K, it is
reasonable to expect that some disclosure in the annual report is appropriate to give stakeholders
a full picture of the cyber landscape of the firm. I examine the first 10-K filed following the date
of the incident. Table 2 contains a list of terms I use to conduct a keyword search for cyber
breach disclosure.
4. Findings
4.1 Frequency and Timeliness of SEC Reporting
I start by summarizing how many data breaches receive any disclosure in the SEC filings.
Figure 1 presents the dramatic lack of SEC reporting of cyber incidents among the examined
firms. Out of a sample of 197 security breaches, only 19 firms made the relevant disclosures to
the SEC (all these firms and incidents are listed in Appendix A). Figure 2 illustrates the actual
format of disclosure. My original expectation was to observe a somewhat timely 8-K disclosure
in line with the 2011 and 2018 SEC recommendations, although likely not following the
currently proposed four-day reporting guidance. Contrary to my expectations, I found that out of
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the reporting sample, only 42 percent reported the incident in an 8-K. In contrast 58 percent (of
the already small reporting sample) discussed the cyber issue in a much less timely periodic 10K report. Notably, every firm that reported the incident in an 8-K, followed up with a 10-K
disclosure that reiterates or elaborates the discussion of the incident. I further examine the speed
of the 8-K reporting in Table 3. I observe that even for the 8 firms that reported the incident in
these ‘current reports,’ they didn’t do it in a timely manner. The mean and median number of
days between the incident (per PRC database) and the 8-K filing date is 22 and 16 days,
respectively, while the max is over two months (Figure 3). Only 1 firm, Under Armor, met the
four-days requirement put forth in the current guidance proposal.
I hypothesized that larger incidents are more likely to generate timely disclosure.
Specifically, I predicted that breaches compromising greater than one million customer files
constitute a material cybersecurity incident requiring disclosure. The data supports my
expectations. Table 4 shows the number of customers impacted for the incidents reported via an
8-K, a 10-K only, or not at all. I first note the pattern of means and medians consistent with my
expectations. The mean customer files affected for firms with the most timely reporting via an 8K is 109 million. When firms chose to disclose only in the annual 10-K filing, the average
customer files number affected was substantially smaller at 17.5 million. This suggests that for
moderate breaches that the organization believes warrant a disclosure, they will likely opt to only
disclose in the 10-K. Lastly, the mean number of customer files affected for firms that chose not
to disclose in any manner is very small at 0.25 million. This supports my initial assumption that
when customer files fall below 1 million, firms will likely choose not to disclose cybersecurity
instances to the public. The medians show a similar trend across the three groups.
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It is interesting to also consider the minimum and maximum values. It is possible that a
cybersecurity incident impacts zero customers, if the underlying data is not customer-related.
However, all eight of the 8-K disclosures are customer-related in contrast to the other two
groups. Contrary to my expectations, the maximums illustrate that even when millions of
customers are impacted, the firms may omit disclosures or make only non-timely ones. Despite
this surprising note, my overall conclusion is that the number of customer files affected
positively influences both overall disclosure probability and disclosure timeliness.
4.2 Length and Nature of Reporting
Next, I quantify the amount of detail provided in the actual disclosures included in the 8K and 10-K reports. Table 5 illustrates the length of the disclosure provided by the organization
to address the cybersecurity incident. Given the increased timeliness of an 8-K disclosure with
desired disclosure falling within a 4-day timeline it is no surprise to see the 8-K results of lengths
of disclosure were very brief, in many cases providing a quick overview of what was found. The
results in Table 5 illustrate that the mean and median length of the relevant 8-K reporting in
sentences were 5 and 2, respectively. The most detailed 8-K contained only 14 sentences and the
briefest one a mere 1 sentence. The 10-K disclosure provided a slightly different story, which
likely is attributed to the increased time the organization had to evaluate what went wrong and
the full effect of the cybersecurity breach. When evaluating the annual 10-K reports of the 19
organizations that made a cybersecurity disclosure, the mean and median were 15 and 13
sentences, respectively, with a maximum of 33 and a minimum of 7.
The results presented in Table 5 shed light on how much detail is provided when firms
make a cybersecurity disclosure. I found the very limited extent of disclosures in the 8-K reports
quite surprising. Even amongst the firms that attempt to meet the SEC cybersecurity
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recommendations for making an informative disclosure, a bare minimum of information is
contained within the report alone. Generally, most reports just state that the organization had a
cybersecurity breach and, in some cases, mention the cause, such as a hack or other means of
infiltration. In the 10-K reports, the informativeness was higher in comparison to the 8-Ks, but
overall even there, it did not meet my expectation of the depth of information that would be
relevant to investors. These findings support the argument that the SEC should make formal
requirements as to what should be included in both length and content to make adequate
representation to investors and to ensure consistency among all firms.
4.3 Internal Control Weaknesses and Incident Reporting
As previously stated, I believe that material weaknesses associated with an organization’s
internal controls could be associated with less disclosure if they indicate a lack of appropriate
internal information systems. On the other hand, they could be associated with more disclosure
due to higher scrutiny. Table 6 tabulates all firms that filed a report indicating an internal control
material weakness among my original dataset of 197 company breaches. I report how these firms
disclosed their breaches. Out of the 11 firms that reported an internal control deficiency, two
firms (Marriott International and eBay) made SEC disclosure. Thus the reporting percentage of
firms with internal control issues (2/11 = 18%) is higher than the reporting percentage of firms
without internal control issues (17/186 = 9%). I found it interesting that these 2 organizations
filed internal weakness reports after their cybersecurity breaches (1 year later for Marriott
International and 2 years later for eBay). This surprised me because I would expect that the
cybersecurity breach would be a strong indicator that an organization may have weak internal
controls, given that someone was able to infiltrate their system. Why did it take so long for each
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organization to file a report to identify that they suffer from compromised or weak internal
controls? Or why did they not remedy this situation sooner?
5. Conclusions
A growing dependence on technology to conduct everyday operations increases the
damage sophisticated cybercriminals can inflict on firms. When it comes to infiltration of an
organization’s private security, perhaps it is not a matter of if but rather when. Therefore, it is in
the best interest of all organizations to manage risk and properly disclose issues to minimize
reputational damage in the eyes of investors and customers. This paper examines 197
cybersecurity breaches of S&P 500 companies that occurred after the first SEC suggested
disclosure guidance in 2011. I find that only 10% of the sample reported cyber incidents in the 8K or the 10-K. Among this small sample, only 42% reported the issue in both current and annual
reports, and 58% reported solely in the less timely annual report. Among the firms that did
provide an 8-K disclosure, shockingly, only 1 firm followed the SEC’s four-day
recommendation. I find that firms gave little detail into the actual breach, providing, on average,
only 5 sentences in the 8-K disclosure and 15 sentences when filing a 10-K. I found that the
number of customers affected by the breach appears to be positively associated with disclosure
likelihood. Surprisingly, I did not observe any association between breach reporting and internal
control weaknesses.
Overall, these results provide further support for the need to normalize policies and
procedures regarding cybersecurity disclosure to maintain consistency among all firms in this
evolving topic. I believe the new SEC Release 33-11038 takes a step in the correct direction by
proposing guidance on the content and timeliness of cybersecurity-related disclosures.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
Number of
Entries
9,016
(8,656)
(104)
(59)
197

Cases Listed in Privacy Rights Clearinghouse’s Data breach Chronology
Less: Companies not included in S&P 500
Less: Breaches before 2011
Less: Joint company breaches
Final Sample

Table 2: Keywords searched in 8-K/10-K filings
Cyber
Breach
Incident
Security
Data breach
Infiltrated
Unauthorized
Attack

*Keywords used to search
for references of cyber
incidents in 8-K/10-K to
categorize occurrences as
reported vs. not reported.

Table 3: 8-K Timeliness
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

Days between Breach
Discovery Date and 8-K
Filing Date

8

22.35

16

4

70

22.47

19

Table 4: Reporting Type and Incident Impact
Variable
Customers
Affected (in millions) –
Firms which made
initial 8-K Disclosures
Customers
Affected (in millions) –
Firms which made
initial 10-K Disclosures
Customers
Affected (in millions) –
Firms which did NOT make
Disclosures

N

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

8

109

101

1

327

108

11

17.5

.4

0

78.8

30.7

178

.25

0

32

2.4

.0017

Table 5: Reporting Length
Variable
Length 8-K Disclosure
(sentences)
Length 10-K Disclosure
(sentences)

N

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Standard
Deviation

8

5.25

2

14

1

5.04

19

14.67

12.5

33

7

7.023

Table 6: Reported Internal Control Weaknesses
Company Name

CIK

Baxter Healthcare
Stanley Black & Decker Inc.
Lockheed Martain
Iron Mountain
Marriot International
Crown Castle International Corp
eBay
MetLife
DXC Technology

10456
93556
936468
1020569
1048286
1051470
1065088
1099219
1658688
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FYE of IC
Weakness
12/31/19
1/2/21
12/31/16
12/31/11
12/31/19
12/31/19
12/31/16
12/31/17
3/31/20

Cybersecurity
Incident Reported?
No
No
No
No
Yes (2018)
No
Yes (2014)
No

Figure 1: Reported vs. Not Reported Incidents

Cyber Incidents
Reported
19

Not Reported
178

Reported

Not Reported

Figure 2: 8-K vs. 10-K Reporting (sample of 19)

Disclosure Patterns

42%
58%

8-K and 10-K

10-K Only
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Figure 3: Timeline of Two Company Disclosures
Fastest: Under Armor (2018)
Customers Affected: 150 million

Breach Occured
April 2014

Reporting Date March
29th, 2018

Discovery Date March
25th, 2018

Slowest: Equifax Corporation (2017)
Customers Affected: 145 million
Reporting Date
September 7th, 2017

Breach Occured
May/June 2017

Discovery Date
July 29, 2017
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Appendix A: Reported Cybersecurity Breaches
Company

Discovery
Date

Customers
Effected

Length of
Disclosure

Exhibits

327,000,000

8-K
Disclosure
Date
11/30/2018

Marriot
International
Google

11/19/2018

2 Pages

10/8/2018

500,000

N/A

N/A

T-Mobile

8/24/18

74,000,000

N/A

N/A

Under Armor

3/25/2018

150,000,000

3/29/2018

FedEx

2/19/2018

119,000

N/A

2
Sentences
N/A

Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release

Equifax
Corporation
Verizon

7/29/2017

145,500,000

9/7/17

6/13/17

6,000,000

N/A

2
Sentences
N/A

4/25/17

0

N/A

N/A

11/26/16

34,055

N/A

N/A

32,000,000
950,000

N/A
1/25/2016

Anthem Inc

6/13/16
Not
Disclosed
1/29/15

78,800,000

N/A

N/A
2
Sentences
N/A

Home Depot

9/2/14

56,000,000

eBay

145,000,000

1 Page/3
Pages
1 Sentence

Target

Early May
2014
12/13/13

9/8/14
9/18/14
5/22/14

40,000,000

2/26/14

3 Pages

NASDAQ.com

7/18/13

0

N/A

N/A

Citigroup

7/17/13

146,000

N/A

N/A

Nvidia

7/13/12

400,000

N/A

N/A

Global
Payment Inc

Not
Disclosed

7,000,000

3/30/12

2
Sentences

Chipotle
Mexican Grill
Quest
Diagnostics
Twitter
Centene
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Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release
Press
Release

10-K
Disclosure
Date
12/31/2019

Length

12/31/2018

2 Paragraphs

12/31/2018

5 Sentences

12/31/2018

1 Paragraph

5/31/2018

1 Paragraph

12/31/2017

2 Pages

12/31/2017

2 Paragraphs

12/31/17

2 Paragraphs

12/31/2016

3 Paragraphs

12/31/2016
12/31/16

1 Paragraph
1 Paragraph

12/31/2015

4 Paragraphs

2/1/15

5 Pages

12/31/2014

2 Paragraphs

2/1/14

3 Pages

12/31/13

2 Paragraphs

12/31/13

3 Pages

1/23/13

1 Paragraph

5/31/13

4 Paragraphs

1.5 Pages

